Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center
September 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1502/
MPRA Paper No. 1502, posted 27. January 2007
Alliances Among Asymmetric Countries
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
(Indian Statistical Institute)
Running Title: Alliances among asymmetric countries.
————————————
∗Address for Correspondence: Prabal Roy Chowdhury,
Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center,
7 - S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi - 110016, INDIA.
E-mail: prabalrc@isid.ac.in.
Fax: 91-11-41493981.
Phone: 91-11-41493930.
Abstract
We examine alliances between asymmetric countries. We find that
the results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If the equilibrium
is an interior one then, with an increase in asymmetry, the level of
the alliance-wide defense good decreases and the divergence between
the first best and the equilibrium level of the defense good increases.
In case the equilibrium involves a corner solution, these results are
reversed though. It may be argued, however, that the interior equilib-
rium case is the more relevant one.
Key words: Alliance; Asymmetry; Public good; Defence.
JEL Classification: D74, P16.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper was motivated by the diversity among the various transnational
collectives, as well as the fact that many of them are undergoing rapid
changes and expansions. The EU, for example, is debating the pros and
cons of inducting new members, in particular Turkey into the union. In
March, 1999, the NATO also inducted several ex-Warsaw countries, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (see Sandler and Murdoch (2000)).
It might be argued, that in the EU, as well as the NATO, asymmetry
among member countries has increased. While, on the average, the larger
countries have gotten larger because of growth, the smaller countries have,
on the average, gotten smaller because of the inclusion of several relatively
smaller countries.
Given these trends, in this paper we analyze alliances between asym-
metric countries. In particular, we examine the effects of an increase in
asymmetry on the level of the public good being provided by such an al-
liance, in absolute terms, as well as relative to the first best level.
In recent years academics have shown a growing interest in transnational
alliances and collectives. Such collectives, e.g. organizations like the UN,
the WTO and the WHO, are concerned with peace-keeping in the world’s
hot spots, controlling environmental degradation and terrorism, promoting
world health, eliminating trade barriers, etc. This interest is also partly
fuelled by the recent troubles confronting organizations like the EU and the
UN.
The theory of such collective organizations, in particular that of (mili-
tary) alliances, was pioneered by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) who analyze
an alliance of countries aimed at providing a pure public good, deterrence.
We refer the readers to Sandler and Hartley (2001) for a succinct survey of
this, by now, large literature. Most importantly, the insights gleaned from
this literature is applicable, not only to military alliances like the NATO,
but to a broad set of collectives.1
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One of the central aims of this literature is to study the effects of asym-
metry among the alliance partners on the outcome. For example, Olson
and Zeckhauser (1966) (as well as much of the subsequent literature) is
motivated, among other things, by the exploitation hypothesis, which says
that relatively larger countries contribute proportionately more to such al-
liances.2 This paper extends this literature by focusing on the effects of an
increase in asymmetry.
We analyze a model with one private good, and two defence goods, one a
country specific defence good, and the other an alliance wide one. To begin
with we provide sufficient conditions such that the exploitation hypothesis
holds. Further, in the appendix, we provide an alternative definition of
the exploitation hypothesis. We then examine the effect of an increase in
asymmetry on the equilibrium outcome. One interesting insight is that the
results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If it is an interior one then,
with an increase in asymmetry, the absolute level of the alliance wide defence
good decreases and the difference between the first best and the equilibrium
level of this good increases. In case the equilibrium is a corner one, these
results are reversed though. It may be argued, however, that the first set of
results are, perhaps, more relevant.
2 THE MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider an alliance between two countries, 1 and 2. Country i is char-
acterized by a size parameter ki, k1 > k2 > 0, that is related to its GNP and
population. There is one private good, X, and two defence goods, one an
alliance wide defence good Y and the other a country specific defence good
Z.3 The endowment of country i is given by kiw, w > 0.
Every country spends a part of its endowment ti (≤ kiw) on defence
activity, and the rest, kiw − ti, on the private good X. An expenditure of
ti on the defence input leads to the joint production of C.ti units of the
country specific defence good Zi and f(ti) units of the alliance wide defence
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good Y . Hence the total production of the alliance wide defence good Y is
f(t1) + f(t2). Thus, apart from the size parameter ki, the two countries are
assumed to be symmetric.4
For simplicity we consider a utility function that is an additively sepa-
rable version of the one in Sandler and Hartley (2001). Thus
Ui(Xi(ti), Y (t1, t2), Zi(ti)) = A.(kiw − ti) + kiB(f(t1) + f(t2)) + kiCti, i = 1, 2,
(1)
where A > Ck1, Ck2 > 0 and C ≥ 0.
While the separability assumption is primarily for simplifying the anal-
ysis, it may not be be too unreasonable. It may be argued though, with
some justification, that a lower level of defence consumption increases a
country’s threat perception, and hence lowers its utility from private con-
sumption. Equation 1, however, can accommodate such concerns. Sup-
pose, for example, that country i’s utility is Ui(Xi(ti)+Y (t1, t2)+Zi(ti))+
Ui(Y (t1, t2), Zi(ti)), where the first term represents its utility from private
consumption, and the second term represents its utility from defence con-
sumption. Such a formulation is clearly consistent with equation (1), while
allowing for the fact that the country’s utility from private consumption
depends on its consumption of defence goods.
We assume that f(ti) and B(f(t1) + f(t2)) satisfy the following proper-
ties.
Assumption 1. f : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is twice differentiable. Also, for all
t > 0, f(t) is increasing without bound and concave.
Assumption 2. B : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is twice differentiable. Also, for all
x > 0, B(x) is increasing and concave.
Assumption 3 states that f(t) and B(f(t1) + f(t2)) satisfy the Inada
conditions.5
Assumption 3. (i) limt→0 f ′(t)→∞ and limt→∞ f ′(t) = 0 .
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(ii) limx→0B′(x)→∞ and limx→∞B′(x) = 0.
We solve for the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game where
the two countries simultaneously decide on their level of ti, 0 ≤ ti ≤ kiw.
To begin with we solve for the reaction functions of the two countries:
∂U1(X1(t1), Y (t1, t2), Z1(t1))
∂t1
= k1B′(f(t1) + f(t2))f ′(t1)− (A− Ck1) = 0, (2)
∂U2(X2(t2), Y (t1, t2), Z2(t2))
∂t2
= k2B′(f(t1) + f(t2))f ′(t2)− (A− Ck2) = 0. (3)
We can write down our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. (i) There is a unique
Nash equilibrium. (ii) If, moreover, Assumption 3 holds, then the equilib-
rium is an interior one.
Proposition 1(i) follows from the contraction mapping approach devel-
oped by Cornes, Hartley and Sandler (1999). The proof for Proposition 1(ii)
is routine, and hence omitted.6
Let the unique Nash equilibrium be denoted by (t∗1, t∗2).
Next, using the fact that k1 > k2, from (2) and (3) it follows that
k1f
′(t∗1) < k2f
′(t∗2). (4)
Given that k1 > k2, from (4) we have that f ′(t∗1) < f ′(t∗2). Since f(t) is
concave, it follows that t∗1 > t∗2, i.e. the larger country spends more on
defence compared to the smaller one.
Definition. The exploitation hypothesis holds if and only if t
∗
1
k1
>
t∗2
k2
.7
We then provide some sufficient conditions under which the exploitation
hypothesis holds. From equation (4) we can write that
t∗2
k2
t∗1f
′(t∗1) <
t∗1
k1
t∗2f
′(t∗2). (5)
4
Suppose f ′(t) is elastic, i.e. −f ′(t)/tf ′′(t) > 1. Then tf ′(t) is increasing in t, so
that t∗2f ′(t∗2) < t∗1f ′(t∗1). From equation (5) it then follows that
t∗1
k1
>
t∗2
k2
.
Proposition 2. (i) t∗1 > t∗2.
(ii) If f ′(t) is elastic i.e. −f ′(t)/tf ′′(t) > 1, then
t∗2
k2
<
t∗1
k1
.
Proposition 2(ii) provides a sufficient condition for the exploitation hy-
pothesis to hold even though f(t) is concave. This is interesting since Weber
and Wiesmeth (1991) provide an example with a concave f(t) such that the
exploitation hypothesis does not hold.
3 MAIN RESULTS
We next turn to the central theme of this paper, the effect of an increase in
asymmetry between the two countries on Y , in absolute terms, as well as
relative to the first best level.
The first task is to formalize the notion of an increase in asymmetry in
this framework. In order to ensure that the change in the size of the larger
country is, in some sense, commensurate with that of the smaller country,
we consider increases in asymmetry such that the average size do not alter.
We therefore consider mean preserving spread of k1 and k2 such that k1+k2
equals some constant K.8
3.1
In this sub-section we examine the effect of a mean-preserving spread of k1
and k2 on the absolute level of Y .
For technical reasons we assume that, ∀t, f ′′(t) = F . Totally differ-
entiating (2) and (3) with respect to k1 and k2, and using the fact that
k1 + k2 = K, we obtain
k1[B′′(.)f ′(t1)2 +B′(.)F ]
dt1
dk1
+ k1B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)
dt2
dk1
= −[B′(.)f ′(t1) + C],(6)
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k2B
′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)
dt1
dk1
+ k2[B′′(.)f ′(t2)2 +B′(.)F ]
dt2
dk1
= [B′(.)f ′(t2) + C]. (7)
Simultaneously solving equations (6) and (7) we obtain
dt1
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
N1
D
, (8)
and,
dt2
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
N2
D
, (9)
where, N1 = −(k1 + k2)B′(.)B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)2 − k2B′(.)2f ′(t1)F
− C[k1B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2) + k2B′′(.)f ′(t2)2 + k2B′(.)F ] > 0,
N2 = (k1 + k2)B′(.)B′′(.)f ′(t2)f ′(t1)2 + k1B′(.)2f ′(t2)F
+ C[k2B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2) + k1B′′(.)f ′(t1)2 + k1B′(.)F ] < 0,
and, D = k1k2[B′(.)2F 2 +B′(.)B′′(.)F (f ′(t1)2 + f ′(t2)2)] > 0.
Clearly, dt
∗
1
dk1
|k1+k2=K > 0 and dt
∗
2
dk1
|k1+k2=K < 0.
Next, from (8) and (9) we have that
d(t1 + t2)
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
N12
D
, (10)
where
N12 = (k1 + k2)B′(.)B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)[f ′(t1)− f ′(t2)] +B′(.)2F [k1f ′(t2)− k2f ′(t1)]
+ CB′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)(k2 − k1) + CB′′(.)[k1f ′(t1)2 − k2f ′(t2)2] + CB′(.)F (k1 − k2).
From (8) and (9) it also follows that
d(f(t1) + f(t2))
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
N
D
, (11)
where, N = B′(.)2F [k1f ′(t2)2 − k2f ′(t1)2] +B′(.)FC[k1f ′(t2)− k2f ′(t1)].
Given that t∗1 > t∗2, it follows that
d(f(t∗1)+f(t
∗
2))
dk1
|k1+k2=K < 0. Thus a mean-
preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to a decline in the equilibrium level of
the alliance wide defence good Y .
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain
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Proposition 3. Suppose that f ′′(t) = F, ∀t > 0. A mean-preserving
spread of k1 and k2 leads to a decline in f(t∗1) + f(t∗2), i.e. the level of the
alliance wide defence good Y .
With increasing asymmetry, the larger country invests more in defence,
since it has more to gain from investing, whereas the smaller country invests
less, since it has less to gain. Thus t∗1 increases, whereas t∗2 decreases. The
decline in t∗2, however, outweighs the increase in t∗1. Hence the result.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the nature of the technology is critical in
determining whether an increase in asymmetry adversely affects the supply
of Y or not. In case f(t) is concave, it does. If f(t) is linear, then, from (11),
it does not. Note that Proposition 3 goes through even if C = 0. Further,
it may go through even if f ′′(t) is not constant.
Example 1. Let f(t) = 1 − e−t.9 From (2) and (3), straightforward
calculations yield that
[1− (f(t∗1) + f(t∗2))]B′(f(t∗1) + f(t∗2)) =
A(k1 + k2)− 2Ck1k2
k1k2
.
A mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to an increase in the right hand
side, so that there is a decrease in f(t∗1) + f(t∗2).10
3.2
In this sub-section we compare the equilibrium level of Y with the first best
level. Note that the aggregate utility
U1(X1(t1), Y (t1, t2), Z1(t1)) + U2(X2(t2), Y (t1, t2), Z2(t2))
= A.[(k1 + k2)w − t1 − t2] + (k1 + k2)B(f(t1) + f(t2)) + C(k1t1 + k2t2).(12)
Let (t′1, t′2) maximize the aggregate utility U1(.) + U2(.). (We can mimic
Proposition 1 to argue that (t′1, t′2) is unique and interior.) Clearly (t′1, t′2)
must satisfy the first order conditions
(k1 + k2)B′(f(t1) + f(t2))f ′(t1) = A− Ck1, (13)
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and, (k1 + k2)B′(f(t1) + f(t2))f ′(t2) = A− Ck2. (14)
From (2), (3), (13) and (14), it follows that (t∗1, t∗2) 6= (t′1, t′2), i.e. (t∗1, t∗2) is
non-optimal.
We then examine the effect of a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 on
(t′1, t′2). Totally differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to k1 and k2, and
using the fact that k1 + k2 = K, we obtain
K[B′′(.)f ′(t1)2 +B′(.)F ]
dt1
dk1
+KB′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)
dt2
dk1
= −C, (15)
and, KB′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2)
dt1
dk1
+K[B′′(.)f ′(t2)2 +B′(.)F ]
dt2
dk1
= C. (16)
Simultaneously solving equations (15) and (16) we obtain
dt1
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
X1
Y
, (17)
and,
dt2
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
X2
Y
, (18)
where, X1 = −CK[B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2) +B′′(.)f ′(t2)2 +B′(.)F ] < 0,
X2 = CK[B′′(.)f ′(t1)f ′(t2) +B′′(.)f ′(t1)2 +B′(.)F ] > 0,
and, Y = K2[B′(.)2F 2 +B′(.)B′′(.)F (f ′(t1)2 + f ′(t2)2)] > 0.
Next, from (17) and (18), it follows that
d(f(t1) + f(t2))
dk1
|k1+k2=K =
X
Y
, (19)
where, X = CKB′(.)F (f ′(t2)− f ′(t1)].
From (13) and (14) it follows that t′1 > t′2. Thus, from (19), for C > 0,
d(f(t′1)+f(t
′
2))
dk1
|k1+k2=K < 0.
We then examine the effect of a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 on
the difference between the optimal and equilibrium level of Y , i.e.
f(t′1) + f(t
′
2)− f(t∗1)− f(t∗2). (20)
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For simplicity we restrict attention to the case where there is no country
specific defence good. Formally, we assume that C = 0. Then, for a mean
preserving spread in k1 and k2, f(t′1) + f(t′2) remains constant (see (19)),
whereas, from (11), f(t∗1) + f(t∗2) decreases.
Summarizing the preceding discussion we have our final result.
Proposition 4. (i) (t∗1, t∗2) 6= (t′1, t′2).
(ii) Suppose that f ′′(t) = F, ∀t > 0. For C > 0, a mean-preserving
spread of k1 and k2 leads to a decline in f(t′1) + f(t′2).
(iii) (a) Suppose that f ′′(t) = F, ∀t > 0. There exists C > 0, such
that ∀C ≤ C, a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to an increase in
f(t′1) + f(t′2)− f(t∗1)− f(t∗2).
(b) Suppose that f ′′(t) = F, ∀t > 0, and B(x) = x. There exists A > 0,
such that ∀A ≥ A, a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to an increase
in f(t′1) + f(t′2)− f(t∗1)− f(t∗2).
Proposition 4(iii), however, may go through even if C is large, or A is
small.
Example 2. Let f(t) = 1− e−t. From (13) and (14), it follows that
B′(f(t′1) + f(t
′
2))[1− (f(t′1) + f(t′2))] =
2A− C(k1 + k2)
k1 + k2
.
Clearly, a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 does not affect f(t′1)+ f(t′2),
whereas, f(t∗1) + f(t∗2) decreases (Example 1). Thus f(t′1) + f(t′2)− f(t∗1)−
f(t∗2) increases.
4 CORNER EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we focus on corner solutions. Hence the Inada conditions, i.e.
Assumptions 3(i) and 3(ii), are not imposed.
Let t1 solve
k1B
′(f(t1) + f(0))f ′(t1) = A− ck1, (21)
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and let t1 solve
k2B
′(f(t1) + f(0))f ′(0) = A− ck2. (22)
Assumption 4. t1 > t1.
It is easy to see that given Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, there exists a unique
corner equilibrium, (t∗1, t∗2), such that t∗1 > 0 and t∗2 = 0. Consequently the
exploitation hypotheses holds, i.e. t
∗
1
k1
> 0 = t
∗
2
k2
.
Hence, even in case of a corner equilibrium, analogues of Propositions
1 and 2 go through. Interestingly, unlike Proposition 2(ii), in this case the
exploitation hypothesis does not require any elasticity condition on f(t).
4.1
We first examine the effect of a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 on the
absolute level of Y . Given that there is a corner solution, (t∗1, t∗2) solves
k1B
′(f(t1) + f(0))f ′(t1) = A− ck1. (23)
Our next proposition follows from equation (23).
Proposition 5. A mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to an
increase in f(t∗1) + f(t∗2), i.e. the level of the alliance wide defence good Y .
Comparing Propositions 3 and 5, we find that the effect of a mean-
preserving spread of k1 and k2 on the level of Y is sensitive to the nature of
the equilibrium. The level of Y increases if the equilibrium is a corner one,
whereas it decreases if the equilibrium is an interior one. Further, unlike
Proposition 3, Proposition 5 does not require any restrictions on f ′′(t).
4.2
We then compare f(t∗1)+f(t∗2), the equilibrium level of Y, with the first best
level, f(t′1)+f(t′2). In case the first best outcome is interior, (t′1, t′2) satisfies
10
equations (13) and (14). Otherwise, t′2 = 0 and t′1 satisfies
(k1 + k2)B′(f(t1) + f(0))f ′(t1) = A− ck1. (24)
The following Proposition follows from our earlier analysis and equation
(24) above.
Proposition 6. (i) (t∗1, t∗2) 6= (t′1, t′2).
(ii) For C > 0, a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to an
increase in f(t′1) + f(t′2).
(iii) There exists C > 0 such that ∀C ≤ C, a mean-preserving spread of
k1 and k2 leads to a decrease in f(t′1) + f(t′2)− f(t∗1)− f(t∗2).
Comparing Propositions 4(iii) and 6(iii) we find that the results are sen-
sitive to the nature of the equilibrium. In case of a corner equilibrium,
a mean-preserving spread of k1 and k2 leads to a decrease in the spread
between the first best and the equilibrium level of Y . For an interior equi-
librium the results are just the opposite.
Interestingly, Propositions 5 and 6(iii) are in the spirit of Itaya et. al.
(1997). In the context of private provision of a public good, Itaya et. al.
(1997) demonstrate that, under a corner equilibrium, an increase in income
asymmetry increases welfare.
Finally, note that the results in this section generalize easily to the case
where the number of countries is more than 1. Suppose that the equilibrium
involves a corner solution, with country 1 being the only country to make a
non-zero investment in defence. It is clear that equations (23) and (24) go
through in this case also. Hence so do analogues of Propositions 5 and 6.
Whether the analysis in Section 3 generalizes in a similar fashion is an
open question. Suppose however, that the countries in the alliance can be
divided into two groups, one group consisting of relatively larger countries,
and the other group consisting of relatively smaller ones. If, moreover,
the groups are relatively homogeneous, then the two country model may,
perhaps, provide a reasonable approximation to reality.
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5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper makes some testable predictions regarding the ef-
fects of asymmetry on transnational collectives in general, and military al-
liances in particular.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the results depend on whether
the equilibrium is an interior, or a corner one. In case the equilibrium
is interior, we find that alliances that are more diverse, are less likely to
perform well, at least as far as the supply of the public good is concerned
(absolutely, as well as relative to the first best level). In case of a corner
equilibrium, however, these results are reversed.
Whether the equilibrium is an interior, or a corner one, is, of course,
an empirical question, and the answer will vary from case to case. It may,
however, be argued that the interior equilibrium case may be the more
relevant one.
From a theoretical point of view, it is doubtful whether an alliance will
form at all if the resulting equilibrium is going to be a corner one. In
that case, assuming that f(0) = 0, country 1 is indifferent between forming
and not forming an alliance.11 Furthermore, suppose that such an alliance
involves some fixed cost for country 1. Such costs may arise because of per-
ceived cultural differences between the two countries, historical animosities,
etc. In that case country 1 would strictly prefer not to form an alliance
at all. The only way such an alliance may form is if country 2 subsidizes
country 1, something that may be politically infeasible.
Further, from an empirical point of view, while there is some support
for the exploitation hypothesis (see endnote 2), it is rarely the case that the
alliance partners contribute nothing at all. Thus, on both these grounds,
the interior equilibrium case may be the more relevant one.
Finally, let us consider a situation where a relatively small country is in
the process of being inducted into an alliance. Suppose that the existing
alliance can be modeled, without too much violation of reality, as a two
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country one. This may be a sensible approximation when the alliance can
be divided into two groups, one consisting of relatively larger, the other
consisting of relatively smaller countries, and the groups are relatively ho-
mogeneous. In that case the induction of the new country may be modeled
as a fall in the average size of the group of smaller countries. At the same
time suppose that the larger countries are growing at a relative faster rate, so
that their average size increases. Our analysis then suggests that, compared
to the existing situation, post-alliance there will be a fall in the alliance wide
public good, absolutely, as well as relative to the first best level.
It goes without saying though, that this is not to argue that such al-
liances should not take place, but rather that the justification for such al-
liances cannot be found in static gains in the supply of public goods. One
possible justification could be in terms of dynamic effects. It is possible, for
example, that as a result of this induction, the new member responds with
a growth in income, leading to an increase in the future supply of the public
good. However, while undoubtedly fascinating, a detailed examination of
such dynamic considerations is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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6 APPENDIX
Revisiting the Exploitation Hypothesis: The literature says that there is
exploitation of country 1 whenever, for k1 > k2,
f(t∗1)/k1
f(t∗2)/k2
= α > 1. Suppose,
however, that even the first best level of t1, t2, i.e. (t′1, t′2) exhibits such
exploitation, in the sense that f(t
′
1)/k1
f(t′2)/k2
= β > 1. In that case it may be
argued that the technology itself is biased in favor of such exploitation.
The following alternative definition takes such bias into account.
Definition. The exploitation hypothesis holds if and only if f(t
∗
1)/k1
f(t∗2)/k2
>
f(t′1)/k1
f(t′2)/k2
, i.e. f(t
∗
1)
f(t′1)
>
f(t∗2)
f(t′2)
.
For β > 1, the standard definition clearly over-estimates the extent of
exploitation vis-a-vis the alternative one proposed here. Whereas for β < 1,
the standard definition under-estimates the extent of exploitation.
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7 END NOTES
1. This point was also made by Olson (1965), as well as Sandler and Hartley
(2001).
2. In 1970 the USA contributed around 75% of the NATO’s defence
spending, while Germany, France and the UK each contributed less than
6%. Between 1990-1999 though, there is little evidence of such imbalance
(Sandler and Murdoch (2000)).
3. Sandler (1977) and Strihou (1967), among others, argue that defence
expenditures lead to multiple outputs with different degrees of publicness.
4. Olson and Zeckhauser (1967) and Wong (1991), among others, allow
for other differences, e.g. the marginal cost of defence.
5. In Section 4 we examine the case where Assumption 3 does not hold,
thus allowing for corner equilibria.
6. We assume that kiw is not too small in the sense that, in equilibrium
ti < kiw, ∀i. A sufficient condition is that g(kiw) > A−ckiki , i = 1, 2, where
g(t) = B′(f(0) + f(t))f ′(t).
7. In the Appendix we provide an alternative definition of the exploita-
tion hypothesis.
8. In the literature on risk and uncertainty also, one uses the idea of
mean-preserving spreads to control for changes in the average income level.
9. f(t) = 1 − e−t violates the Inada condition that limt→0 f ′(t) → ∞.
However, since this condition is required for proving existence alone, this
does not affect our argument.
10. The constancy of f ′′(t), is, however, ‘necessary’ in the sense that
Proposition 3 may fail if it is violated. Suppose f(t) = t
1
2 . From (2) and
(3), we find that 2(f(t
∗
1)+f(t
∗
2))
B′(f(t∗1)+f(t
∗
2))
= A(k1+k2)−2Ck1k2(A−Ck1)(A−Ck2) . A mean-preserving spread
of k1 and k2 leads to an increase in the right hand side, so that there is an
increase in f(t∗1) + f(t∗2).
11. In this case, irrespective of whether a coalition forms or not, the first
order condition for country 1 is given by k1B′(f(t1))f ′(t1) = A− Ck1.
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